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WHAT IS A COMMON ENTERPRISE?
A QUESTION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "investment contract" was first defined by the United States Supreme
Court in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.1 The application of this definition has been the
subject of extensive litigation. Howey articulated a three part test to define an "in-
vestment contract": (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3)
with profits dependent solely upon the efforts of a third party.' The circuit courts
have not agreed on the application of the "common enterprise" element of the
Howey test, and the Supreme Court has failed to resolve the conflict. This com-
ment will address the scope of the federal securities laws and more particularly the
term "investment contract" which is part of the broad definition of a "security."
The comment will also discuss each circuit court's interpretation of the Howey test
along with policy considerations of each court and will suggest a uniform approach
which should be adopted by the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict.
The relationship between a promoter and an investor presents lawmakers with
some very difficult problems. Lawmakers must decide what degree of protection,
if any, should be given to the investor. Traditionally, the investors were thought to
be protected by the fact that the transactions were at arm's length and both parties
had equal bargaining power. However, without some type of regulation, the in-
vestor cannot make an informed decision because he lacks access to the informa-
tion in the possession of the promoter. This scenario has provided a great
temptation for fraud and deception and, consequently a need for government regu-
lation. As a result of the 1929 Stock Market Crash, Congress adopted the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934 to eliminate abuse of the financial
market system.3 The two Acts were designed to promote disclosure of material
information and protect the public from purchasing worthless securities because
of nondisclosure or misrepresentation. 4
1. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See infra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
2. Id. at 298-99.
3. Ernst& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-
5(1933)).
4. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 237 (2d Cir.
1985).
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II. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
The scope of the federal securities laws is limited by the definition of a "secu-
rity."' Although the exact wording of the two Acts is somewhat different, the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that the definitions are essentially the same and
should be treated as such.' The definitions of "security" are very broad and allow
courts the flexibility "to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek use of money of others on the promise of profits."7
As noted above, the Supreme Court had not defined the term "investment con-
tract" until its holding in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.8 In Howey, the SEC brought an
action against the W.J. Howey Company to enjoin the sale of unregistered securi-
ties.' The central issue in Howey was whether the interests offered by Howey con-
stituted an "investment contract" under section 2(1) of the 1933 Act.10
The Howey case involved a Florida citrus grove owned by the W.J. Howey
Company. 11 The Howey Company would plant approximately 500 acres annually,
5. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act states:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securi-
ties (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act states:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas or other mineral royalty or lease, any collat-
eral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national secu-
rities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "secu-
rity"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, or any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is like-
wise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(10) (1982) (emphasis added).
6. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982). See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
342 (1967).
7. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). Congress "sought to define 'the term "security" in
sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in
our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.' "United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1933)).
8.328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Court first used the term "investment contract" in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). While the Court employed this term to describe transactions at issue, no definition
of "investment contract" was articulated.
9. 328 U.S. at 294.
10. Id. at 297.
11. Id. at 295.
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offering about half of the groves to the public.12 The prospective investors were
offered both a land sales contract and a service contract. 3 The service contracts
were purchased by eighty-five percent of the investors.14 The investors who pur-
chased the service contracts retained no right of entry to market their produce
without the consent of the company."5 All produce was pooled with individual
profits based upon an allocation of crop volume determined on each tract at the
time of the picking.16 After the sale of the fruit, the profits were divided among
the landowners on a pro rata basis.17
Recognizing that "investment contract" was not defined within the Securities
Act, the Court looked to state "blue sky" laws to ascertain the meaning of the
term.18 The Court determined that "investment contract" had been uniformly de-
fined by state courts as an investment of "money in a common enterprise with the
expectation that the investors would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the
promoter or of some one [sic] other than themselves."19 In Howey, the Court con-
cluded that all three elements of the test were present: (1) there was an investment
of money; (2) there was a common enterprise because the Howey Company was
dependent upon capital provided by all of the investors;2" and (3) profits were to be
obtained solely from the efforts of others.21
The Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight22 recognized the "common enter-
prise" element of the Howey test." The plaintiffs in Tcherepnin were a number of
individuals who held withdrawable shares in an Illinois corporation.24 The plain-
tiffs would only receive a return on their investments if the corporation made a
profit.2" No interest rate was set on the investment, and the return was based
solely upon the success of the corporation.2 In Tcherepnin the Court held that the
plaintiffs' participation in a money-lending operation satisfied the element of
"common enterprise" because their profits were dependent upon the management
of the money-lending operation.27
The circuit courts disagree regarding the proper test for determining whether a




15. Id. at 296.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 298.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 300.
21. Id.
22. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
23. Id. at 338.
24. Id. at 339.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 338
1990]
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very narrow "horizontal commonality" test.28 Under this narrow test there must
be multiple investors and pooling of funds.29 The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Elev-
enth Circuits have adopted a much broader "vertical commonality" test. Vertical
commonality only requires a relationship between the investor and the promoter
whereby the investor's profits are totally dependent upon the expertise of the pro-
moter.3" There is no need for multiple investors.31 Vertical commonality can best
be illustrated by a one-on-one relationship between the investor and the pro-
moter. 2 The Ninth Circuit has adopted a strict vertical commonality test requir-
ing the investor's and promoter's success or failure to be mutually dependent.33
III. HORIZONTAL COMMONALITY
Horizontal commonality involves a commonality between the investors them-
selves." The relationship between the multiple investors is critical. The circuits
adopting horizontal commonality are much more concerned with the relationship
between the multiple investors than with the relationship between the investors
and the promoters.
The "common enterprise" issue has surfaced in many cases involving commod-
ity trading accounts. In the Third Circuit case of Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith,3" the plaintiff argued that the manner in which his commodity
trading account was handled constituted an investment contract within the defini-
tion of "security."36 The court held that a commodity account did not meet the
"common enterprise" element of the Howey test.37 The court strictly construed the
Howey definition and held that the investment was not part of "a pooled group of
funds and thus does not meet the second part of the Howey test."38 In Curran v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. " the Sixth Circuit adopted the hori-
zontal commonality test thus specifically rejecting the vertical commonality ap-
28. Note, Are Discretionary Commodity Trading Accounts Investment Contracts? The Supreme Court Must De-
cide, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 635, 640 (1986) (authored by John Letteri).
29. See, e.g., Salcer v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, 651 F2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir. 1981);
see also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 at 479.
32. 651 F.2d at 1183.
33. See, e.g., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
34. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 1980).
35. 682 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 460 (citing Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affd without
opinion, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974)).
38. 682 F.2d at 460; see also 352 F Supp. 1066, 1066-67 & n.2. The plaintiff alleged violations of the securi-
ties laws, and the defendant moved for a dismissal, contending that the transaction did not involve a security un-
der the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Defendants had originally moved to
dismiss based on the contention that commodity futures contracts were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commodities Exchange Act of 1936 and therefore were not within the jurisdiction of the securities laws. The
court determined that the common enterprise element of Howey was not met; therefore, the agreement was not
considered an investment contract. Wasnowic, 352 F. Supp. at 1067 n.2.
39. 622 F2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 906 (1981), affd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
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proach. 4 Curran also involved an investment in a discretionary commodity
trading account.41 The court acknowledged the debate between horizontal and
vertical commonality.42 Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs in Curran asserted that the
"common enterprise" element was met by a one-on-one vertical relationship be-
tween the promoter and the investor.43 The court rejected this vertical approach
adopted by the Fifth Circuit and instead adopted the more restrictive horizontal
approach." The court held that the "common enterprise" element of Howey can
only be met when "there also exists between discretionary account customers
themselves some relationship which ties the fortunes of each investor to the suc-
cess of the overall venture."4"
The court in Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc. 4 held that a purchase agree-
ment along with a management contract did not meet the horizontal test.4 The
plaintiff in Deckebach purchased a boat and also entered into an agreement with
the promoter whereby the promoter would manage the boat and charter it.' Al-
though there were several similar investments taken by the promoters, the court
held that they did not meet the horizontal test because the investments were inde-
pendent and therefore were not "pooled.""
In the case of SEC v. Professional Associates,"0 the promoter sent out a promo-
tional brochure to potential investors stating that individuals do not have the pur-
chasing power to move enough money to "maximize" their profit margin." The
court held that the brochure was enough evidence to meet the horizontal common-
ality test which is applied by the Sixth Circuit.
52
The leading case in the Seventh Circuit is Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.
In Milnarik, the investors brought suit to rescind their discretionary trading ac-
count in commodity futures." Although the court acknowledged that the term
"security" should be interpreted broadly, it still adopted the more restrictive hori-
zontal view of the common enterprise test. The court held that the discretionary
40. Id. at 222.
41. Id. at 217. "Plaintiffs allege[d] that Merrill Lynch fraudulently misrepresented how the account would be
handled with respect to other accounts in the same program." Id. at 220.
42. Id. at 22 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 223-24.
45. Id. at 224. The Court also stated: "[11n our view the finding of a vertical common enterprise based solely
on the relationship between promoter and investor is inconsistent with Howey." Id.
46. 867 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 283.
48. Id. at 279-80. The plaintiffs ultimate plan was to use the boat solely for personal purposes. Id. at 280.
49. Id. at 282-83. See also Hart v. Pulte Homes Corp., 735 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that a sale-and-
leaseback arrangement did not meet the requirement of horizontal commonality).
50. 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 354.
52. Id. The lower court held "that this language gave rise to an implication that investor's funds were to be
pooled, a situation which would meet the common enterprise requirement." Id.
53. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
54. Id. at 275. The plaintiffs sought to rescind the contract and recover their deposit plus interest alleging
violation of the registration requirements of the federal securities laws.
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commodity investments were independent and that there was no commonality be-
tween the independent investors; therefore, the "common enterprise" element of
Howey was not satisfied. 5 The court in Milnarik affirmed the holding of the lower
court that a discretionary commodities account created nothing more than an
agency-for-hire relationship rather than a sale of a portion of a larger enterprise. 6
In Stenger v. R. H. Love Galleries, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reiterated its strict
adherence to the "horizontal" test of common enterprise under which there must be
a pooling of investments with investors receiving a pro rata portion of the profits.
The Stenger court held that even the test of vertical commonality would not be met
because the fortunes of the investor and the promoter were not interwoven.5 9 Hor-
izontal commonality requires a much stronger relationship between investors.6"
"In fact, a finding of horizontal commonality requires a sharing or pooling of
funds. "61
IV. RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING HORIZONTAL COMMONALITY
Probably the strongest argument that can be made for the adoption of horizontal
commonality is the fact that horizontal commonality best complies with the par-
ticular facts of the Howey case. It can be argued, however, that the facts of the
Howey case would pass any of the standards that have been applied in the circuit
courts. Howey involved a pooling of investors and a pooling of funds.62 However,
there is a question as to whether or not there was actual "pooling" in the Howey
case. 3 Two commentators have concluded that since each individual owned a
55. Id. at 278 (quoting Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F Supp. 1149, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affd,
457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972)).
56. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting Milnarik v. M-S Com-
modities, Inc., 320 F Supp. 1149, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affd, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972)).
57. 741 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1984). The plaintiff in this case purchased paintings from defendant along with a
guaranteed repurchase allowance whereby he could return a painting within five years and have the full amount
of the purchase credited toward the purchase of other paintings. This gave the investor the ability to invest in
different paintings without the need for additional capital. Id. at 146. The plaintiff alleged that this scheme was a
security." Id.
58. Id. at 146.
59. Id. at 147.
60. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 E2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir. 1981). This case in-
volved a loan participation agreement between the two parties, both financial institutions. Id. at 1175. The court
held this agreement was not a security. Id. at 1181.
61. Id. at 1183 (citing Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977)).
62. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946).
63. See, e.g., Gordon, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory for Defining Invest-
ment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 635, 645.
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separate tract of land there was actually no "pooling" in Howey, and, therefore, the
Howey case does not pass the horizontal commonality test.64
The circuits adopting horizontal commonality argue that a finding of common
enterprise based solely on a one-to-one relationship between investor and pro-
moter would "effectively excise[] the common enterprise requirement of How-
ey. "6 The new test would simply require (i) the investment of money with (2)
expectation of profits produced solely from the efforts of others.68 The court in
Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc. 67 stated that, although the phrase
"common enterprise" had never been defined by the Supreme Court, it is not inti-
mated that the phrase is "somehow redundant of other elements of the definition of
a security.""5 The vertical commonality requirement will almost always be met if
the "solely from the profits of others"6 9 requirement is met. The circuits adopting
commonality must answer the question: If the common enterprise element is to be
interpreted so broadly, then why is it even part of the test?
The circuit courts adopting the horizontal scheme also point to the fact that the
investors in the Howey case could not have earned a profit if they had not been
pooling with the other investors .7' However, when the lots were added together
with the lots of other investors in a common venture, the investors were able to
make a profit. 71 This important factor seems to, indicate that the common enter-
prise element of the Howey case required pooling, and this is the interpretation fol-
lowed by the circuits adopting horizontal commonality.
V. VERTICAL COMMONALITY
The circuit courts adopting vertical commonality take a much broader ap-
proach to the common enterprise element of the Howey test. The Fifth Circuit in
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 72 adopted such an analysis, requiring only that
64. Id. at 645; see also Bennett, How Common is a "Common Enterprise"?, 1974 ARiz. ST. L.J. 339, 349.
"Pooling" has been interpreted to refer to an arrangement whereby the account constitutes a single unit of
a larger investment enterprise on which units are sold to different investors and the profitability of each
unit depends on the profitability of the enterprise as a whole . . . . Thus, an example of horizontal com-
monality involving brokerage account [sic] would be a "commodity pool," in which investors' funds are
placed in a single account and transactions are executed on behalf of the entire account rather than being
attributed to any particular subsidiary account. The profit or loss shown by the account as a whole is
ultimately allocated to each investor according to the relative size of his or her contribution to the fund.
Each investor's rate of return is thus entirely a function of the rate of return shown by the entire account.
Gordon, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory for Defining Investment Contracts and
Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 635,645 n.72 (quoting Savino v. EF. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1236
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
65. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Ber-
man v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F Supp. 311,315-16 (S.D. Ohio 1979)).
66. Id.
67. 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
68. Id. at 319.
69. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
70. Note, Are Discretionary Commodity Trading Accounts Investment Contracts? The Supreme Court Must De-
cide, 35 CATH. U.L. RE. 635, 657 (1986) (authored by John Letteri).
71. Id.
72. 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the investors' success be dependent solely upon the efforts of the promoter.73 The
Koscot case involved a pyramid scheme in which investors received varying dis-
counts on cosmetics depending on the amount of their original investment.74 The
court in Koscot held that the fact that the success of one investor is independent of
other investors is not decisive;7" rather, the commonality requirement is met when
the fortunes of all investors are totally dependent upon Koscot's ability to recruit
prospects and consummate sales. 76 As the Koscot court pointed out, the Howey
Court referred to common enterprise in terms of commonality between the pro-
moters as opposed to commonality between investors.77 The court stated: "A
common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties with adequate per-
sonnel and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their par-
amount aim of a return on their investments."78 This language creates a strong
argument that the common enterprise element of the Howey test refers to common-
ality between promoters and not investors.
The Fifth Circuit dealt with a discretionary commodity account in SEC v. Con-
tinental Commodities Corp.79 The court reaffirmed its adherence to vertical com-
monality and held that the discretionary commodity account met the common
enterprise element of the Howey test.8" The court held that the investors were de-
pendent upon the expertise of the promoter for the success of their investment and
this factor was enough to satisfy vertical commonality.81 The court in Continental
Commodities noted that the language of Koscot "expressly rejects the proposition
that the pro-rata sharing of profits is critical to a finding of commonality."82 The
critical test is whether the profits of the investor are totally dependent upon the ex-
pertise of the promoter. 3 The court went on to state that the fortuity of some in-
vestors should not vitiate the fact that the whole trading enterprise is dependent
upon the investment counseling of the corporation. This broad interpretation of
the common enterprise element is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's equally broad
interpretation of the "solely from the efforts of others" element of Howey in the
case of SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.
85
The most recent Fifth Circuit case utilizing the vertical test for common enter-
prise is Long v. Shultz Cattle Co. 86 The plaintiffs in Long invested in a cattle feed-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 475. At the lowest level the salespersons received a 45% discount; for a $1,000 investment the
supervisors received a 55 % discount; and for $5,000 investors receive a 65 % discount on Koscot products. Id.
75. Id. at 479.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 478.
78. Id. (quoting SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)).
79. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. ld. at 522.
81. Id.




86. 881 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1989).
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ing program that required the purchase of cattle together with a feeding
arrangement contract.87 The plaintiffs claimed that this investment scheme consti-
tuted an "investment contract" and was, therefore, within the definition of a secu-
rity thereby requiring compliance with the federal securities laws.88 The court, in
addressing the common enterprise element of the Howey test, stated: "[T]he criti-
cal inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the investments collectively is es-
sentially dependent upon promoter expertise."" The court went on to say that
"[wihile our standard requires interdependence between the investors and the pro-
moter, it does not define that interdependence narrowly in terms of shared profits
or losses. "90 The interdependence may be demonstrated by a showing of complete
reliance upon the expertise of the promoter even if the promoter's profits are not
dependent on the investors' profits.91 The court held that the investment involved
in the Long case met the Fifth Circuit's broad interpretation of the common enter-
prise element of Howey. 92
The Eighth Circuit addressed the commonality issue indirectly in the case of
Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services. 93 In Booth the court held that a private
remedy for churning a commodity account exists within the Securities Act of
1934.1' This decision has been interpreted as an adoption of vertical commonal-
ity.95
The Tenth Circuit in McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co.98 rejected a
rigid horizontal commonality standard and instead elected to adopt a broad inter-
pretation of the Howey case.97 McGill involved the plaintiff's investment in a joint
venture for the development of a subdivision.98 The court did not adopt the lan-
guage of "vertical commonality"; however, it did specifically reject horizontal
commonality. The court stated: "The lack of 'horizontal commonality' between
McGill and any other investors cannot obscure the economic reality of the situa-
tion and the existence of a 'common enterprise' within the meaning of the Howey
test." 99
87. Id. at 130. The investors were able to use the investment as a tax shelter by utilizing the cash-method of
accounting. This method allowed taxpayers to deduct feeding costs and defer income until the cattle were sold.
Id. at 131.
88. Id. at 130.
89. Id. at 140 (quoting SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974)).
90. Id. at 140-41.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 142. The court held that the investment in the cattle feeding program was a security. Id.
93. 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970).
94. Id. at 133.
95. See Christensen Hatch Farms v. Peavey Co., 505 F Supp. 903,907 (Minn. 1981). The court in Christen-
sen held that a discretionary commodities account was a security.
96. 776 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 925.
98. Id. at 924. The investors were to invest in the development of the subdivision but, unfortunately, there was
a lack of development, and the company never became an active one. As a result the plaintiffs alleged material
misrepresentations in violation of the securities laws. Id.
99. Id. at 926. But see Rother v. La Renovista Estates, Inc., 603 F Supp. 533, 537 (W.D. Okla. 1984). In this
case the court stated that the Western District of Oklahoma followed "horizontal commonality." Id. at 537.
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The Eleventh Circuit in Villeneuve v. Advanced Business Concepts Corp. 100 also
adopted the broad view of vertical commonality, citing the Fifth Circuit with ap-
proval.1"1 Villeneuve involved an investment in the distribution of self-watering
planters. 102 The court held that the investment scheme met the common enterprise
element of Howey. 3 In Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co. 104 the federal district court
for the northern district of Georgia also approved vertical commonality in a case
involving a discretionary commodity account. 10
VI. RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING VERTICAL COMMONALITY
The circuits adopting vertical commonality take the position that the common
enterprise element of the Howey test should be interpreted broadly so as to ensure
that the remedial intent of the securities laws is achieved. The Howey case repeat-
edly states that the securities laws should be interpreted broadly in order to meet
their intended remedial purpose. 106
The Court in Howey acknowledged that the definition of an "investment con-
tract" should be construed to include many different types of instruments that may
fall within the concept of a security.107 The definition "embodies a flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits.""1 8 A narrow reading such as that adopted by the horizontal
commonality circuits would not be consistent with the intent of Congress or the
Supreme Court in the Howey opinion.1"9 The Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v.
Knight 10 stated: "Finally, we are reminded that, in searching for the meaning and
scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be on economic reality."111
The Court in Howey recognized that the term "investment contract" had been
adopted in many state "blue sky" laws, and, although the term was undefined, it
was broadly construed to afford the public the greatest measure of protection. 12
An investment contract was considered to be any scheme for "the placing of capital
100. 698 E2d 1121 (1 lth Cir. 1983), reh'ggranted, 730 F.2d 1403 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 1124 (citing SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974)).
102. Id. at 1122.
103. Id. at 1124. Although the court held that the scheme met the "common enterprise" element, it did not
meet the "solely from the efforts of others" requirement; therefore it was held not to be a security. Id. at 1125.
104. 572 F Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
105. Id. at 670-71. The court failed to grant defendant's motion for dismissal for lack of subject matterjurisdic-
tion under the federal securities laws. Id. at 671-72.
106. SECv. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
107. 328 U.S. at 299.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
111. Id. at 336 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1986)).
112. 328 U.S. at 298.
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or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its em-
ployment." 13
The Securities Exchange Act was enacted as a form of remedial legislation.114
The primary purpose of the Act is to protect investors by requiring full disclosure
by those who issue securities.11 Congress did not intend for the definition of a
"security" to be restrictively applied.116 "[Tihe term 'security' [in the Securities
Act of 1933 is defined] in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include
within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security."" 7
An adoption of horizontal commonality would require multiple investors to be
involved before the securities laws could be applied to an investment contract.
This result is not properly founded. Why should the securities laws only protect
investors in groups? Is a single investor not entitled to the same protections that
the securities laws offer to multiple investors? In Koscot, the court pointed out that
in the Howey opinion the Supreme Court did not emphasize the pooling of the
profits, but rather the fact that the entire enterprise in attracting investors de-
pended solely on the availability of Howey's management program."'
VII. RESTRICTED VERTICAL COMMONALITY
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a more strict interpretation of vertical common-
ality. 9 In Brodt v. Bache & Co., 120 the court held that a discretionary commodity
account was not a security because it did not meet the "common enterprise" test of
Howey. 12' The court refused to adopt the very broad interpretation of the Fifth
Circuit and instead adopted a test whereby the "fortunes of the investor [must be]
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the
investment or of third parties."22 The court in Brodt held that a discretionary
commodity account did not meet the "common enterprise" element because the in-
vestors' profits were not directly related to either the promoter's financial well-be-
ing or his ability to perform a duty which would "secure" the investment.' 23 The
Ninth Circuit requires the profits of the investor and the promoter to be interde-
pendent. 124 In other words, the promoter and the investor must either fail or suc-
ceed together.
113. Id. (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)).
114. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 338.
117. Id. at 338 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933)).
118. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).
119. See, e.g., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 E2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
120. 595 F 2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
121.Id. at 462.
122. Id. at 460 (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973)).
123. Id. at 462.
124. id. at 4 60.
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In the more recent case of Hocking v. DuBois, 2' involving an investment in a
condominium and participation in a rental pool arrangement,' 26 the Ninth Circuit
clarified its position as to the "common enterprise" element.127 The court stated
that it had not replaced horizontal commonality with vertical commonality;
rather, it merely broadened the test beyond the "strict pooling" requirement of
strict horizontal commonality. 128 "In other words, we simply added an additional
means of establishing a common enterprise, which comes into play only when
there is no pooling of funds by several investors in a venture."129
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to rule on the "common
enterprise" issue, a series of district court opinions from that circuit appears to
adopt the restricted vertical requirement of the Ninth Circuit.'30 The court in Lo-
wenbraun v. Rothschild' stated that "[v]ertical commonality is present when
there is interdependence between broker and client for both profits and losses of
the investment. 13 2 The court in Lowenbraun held that a broker-client relationship
did not satisfy the vertical commonality test stated in Kaplan v. Shapiro. '33 The
district courts of the First Circuit have also adopted the strict vertical commonal-
ity approach of the Ninth Circuit.' 34
VIII. RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING RESTRICTED VERTICAL COMMONALITY
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to formally adopt restricted vertical com-
monality, although districts in the First and Second Circuits also seem to have
adopted this test.135 The difference between vertical commonality and restricted
vertical commonality is that the latter requires the profits of the promoters and in-
vestors to be interdependent.' 36 The broader interpretation of vertical commonal-
ity does not require this interdependence. The argument for this view is very
similar to the arguments for horizontal commonality. The Ninth Circuit is trying
to give more meaning to the term "common enterprise" by requiring the profits of
the promoter and investor to be interdependent.' 37 At least within this view the
promoter and investor are in a "common enterprise." The Ninth Circuit is not
willing to define "common enterprise" so broadly as to practically excise the ele-
125. 839 F.2d 560, 562-63 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 852 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.), vacated 863 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.
1988).
126. Id. at 562-63.
127. 839 F.2d at 566-67.
128. Id. at 567 (citing Brodt, 595 E2d at 460).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.
131. 685 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
132. Id. at 341.
133. Id. (citing Kaplan v. Shapiro, 655 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). See also Department of Economic
Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1463, 1473 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that "either horizontal or
narrow vertical commonality satisfies the 'common enterprise' requirement").
134. See, e.g., Morgan v. Financial Planning Advisors, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 923, 926 (D. Mass. 1988); Cope-
land v. Hill, 680 F. Supp. 466,468 (D. Mass. 1988).
135. See supra notes 130 and 134.
136. 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
137. Id.
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ment from the definition of "investment contract. '138 This is the strongest argu-
ment against the Fifth Circuit's view. The restricted vertical commonality
approach is a compromise between horizontal and vertical commonality. How-
ever, the reasoning behind this approach fails because a plaintiff in a case that
passes restricted vertical commonality does not deserve any greater degree of pro-
tection than a plaintiff in a case that only passes the broad test of vertical common-
ality. For this reason, the theory behind the securities laws does not warrant a
distinction between the two cases. In fact, the investors would probably need less
protection in a case that passes restricted vertical commonality than would the in-
vestors in a case that only passes vertical commonality, because the promoter in
the former case would have more incentive to protect the investors because profits
are interdependent.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a case that will not pass the hori-
zontal commonality test so that the split between the circuits can be reconciled.
The rationale behind the three different views is clear. The circuits supporting
horizontal commonality adhere to a strict interpretation of the Howey decision as
applied to the facts in Howey. The circuits supporting vertical commonality rely
more on the intent of the securities laws. Restricted vertical commonality is a
compromise between vertical and horizontal commonality. In order to carry out
the intent of Congress, the Supreme Court should rule in favor of vertical com-
monality. Congress enacted the securities laws to protect the public and to deter
fraud. There is no logical distinction between horizontal and vertical commonal-
ity in terms of public protection. The definition of an "investment contract" should
be interpreted broadly because the public needs protection in both cases. The
court in Howey expressly stated that the definition of "investment contract" should
not be given a restrictive interpretation.
Stephen M. Maloney
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